Exploring the Landscape of Spatial Robustness by Engstrom, Logan et al.
Exploring the Landscape of Spatial Robustness
Logan Engstrom∗
MIT
engstrom@mit.edu
Brandon Tran∗
MIT
btran115@mit.edu
Dimitris Tsipras∗
MIT
tsipras@mit.edu
Ludwig Schmidt
MIT
ludwigs@mit.edu
Aleksander Ma˛dry
MIT
madry@mit.edu
Abstract
The study of adversarial robustness has so far largely focused on perturbations bound in `p-norms.
However, state-of-the-art models turn out to be also vulnerable to other, more natural classes of perturbations
such as translations and rotations. In this work, we thoroughly investigate the vulnerability of neural
network–based classifiers to rotations and translations. While data augmentation offers relatively small
robustness, we use ideas from robust optimization and test-time input aggregation to significantly improve
robustness. Finally we find that, in contrast to the `p-norm case, first-order methods cannot reliably find
worst-case perturbations. This highlights spatial robustness as a fundamentally different setting requiring
additional study.1
1 Introduction
Neural networks are now widely embraced as dominant solutions in computer vision (Krizhevsky et al.,
2012; He et al., 2016), speech recognition (Graves et al., 2013), and natural language processing (Collobert &
Weston, 2008). However, while their accuracy scores often match (and sometimes go beyond) human-level
performance on key benchmarks (He et al., 2015; Taigman et al., 2014), models experience severe performance
degradation in the worst case.
In this case, models are vulnerable to so-called adversarial examples, or slightly perturbed inputs that
are almost indistinguishable from natural data to a human but cause state-of-the-art classifiers to make
incorrect predictions (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015). This raises concerns about the use of
neural networks in contexts where reliability, dependability, and security are important.
There is a long line of work on methods for constructing adversarial perturbations in various set-
tings (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2017; Sharif et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Papernot et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018). However,
these methods largely rely on perturbations that are quite contrived and hence unlikely to exist in the real
world. For example, in the context of image recognition, a large body of work has focused on fooling models
with carefully crafted, `p-bounded perturbations in pixel-space.
As such, one may suspect that adversarial examples are a problem only in the presence of a truly malicious
attacker, and are unlikely to arise in more benign environments. However, recent work has shown that
neural network–based vision classifiers are vulnerable to input images that have been spatially transformed
through small rotations, translations, shearing, scaling, and other natural transformations (Fawzi & Frossard,
∗Equal Contribution
1Code for CIFAR10 available at https://github.com/MadryLab/adversarial_spatial (TensorFlow) and for ImageNet at https:
//github.com/MadryLab/spatial-pytorch (PyTorch).
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2015; Kanbak et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018; Tramèr & Boneh, 2017). Such transformations are pervasive in
vision applications and hence quite likely to naturally occur in practice. The vulnerability of neural networks
to such transformations raises a natural question:
How can we build spatially robust classifiers?
We address this question by first performing an in-depth study of neural network–based classifier
robustness to two basic image transformations: translations and rotations. While these transformations
appear natural to a human, we show that small rotations and translations alone can significantly degrade
accuracy. These transformations are particularly relevant for computer vision applications since real-world
objects do not always appear perfectly centered.
Natural Adversarial Natural Adversarial Natural Adversarial
“revolver” “mousetrap” “vulture” “orangutan” “ship” “dog”
Figure 1: Examples of adversarial transformations and their predictions in the standard, "black canvas", and
reflection padding setting.
1.1 Our Methodology and Results
Our goal is to obtain a fine-grained understanding of the spatial robustness of standard, near state-of-the-art
image classifiers for the MNIST (LeCun, 1998), CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky, 2009), and ImageNet (Russakovsky
et al., 2015) datasets.
Classifier brittleness. We find that small rotations and translations consistently and significantly degrade
accuracy of image classifiers on a number of tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1. Our results suggest that
classifiers are highly brittle: even small random transformations can degrade accuracy by up to 30%. Such
brittleness to random transformations suggests that these models might be unreliable even in benign settings.
Relative adversary strength. We then perform a thorough analysis comparing the abilities of various
adversaries—first-order, random, and grid-based—to fool models with small rotations and translations. In
particular, we find that exhaustive grid search-based adversaries are much more powerful than first-order
adversaries. This is in stark contrast to results in the `p-bounded adversarial example literature, where
first-order methods can consistently find approximately worst-case inputs (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Madry
et al., 2018).
Spatial loss landscape. To understand why such a difference occurs, we delve deeper into the classifiers
to try and understand the failure modes induced by such natural transformations. We find that the loss
landscape of classifiers with respect to rotations and translations is highly non-concave and contains many
spurious maxima. This is, again, in contrast to the `p-bounded setting, in which, experimentally, the value of
different maxima tend to concentrate well (Madry et al., 2018). Our loss landscape results thus demonstrate
that any adversary relying on first order information might be unable to reliably find misclassifications.
Consequently, rigorous evaluation of model robustness in this spatial setting requires techniques that that go
beyond what was needed to induce `p-based adversarial robustness.
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Improving spatial robustness. We then develop methods for alleviating these vulnerabilities using in-
sights from our study. As a natural baseline, we augment the training procedure with rotations and
translations. While this does largely mitigate the problem on MNIST, additional data augmentation only
marginally increases robustness on CIFAR10 and ImageNet. We thus propose two natural methods for
further increasing the robustness of these models, based on robust optimization and aggregation of random
input transformations. These methods offer significant improvements in classification accuracy against both
adaptive and random attackers when compared to both standard models and those trained with additional
data augmentation. In particular, on ImageNet, our best model attains a top1 accuracy of 56% against the
strongest adversary, versus 34% for a standard network with additional data augmentation.
Combining spatial and `∞-bounded attacks. Finally, we examine the interplay between spatial and `∞-
based perturbations. We observe that robustness to these two classes of input perturbations is largely
orthogonal. In particular, pixel-based robustness does not imply spatial robustness, while combining spatial
and `∞-bounded transformations seems to have a cumulative effect in reducing classification accuracy. This
emphasizes the need to broaden the notions of image similarity in the adversarial examples literature beyond
the common `p-balls.
2 Related Work
The fact that small rotations and translation can fool neural networks on MNIST and CIFAR10 was, to the best
of our knowledge, first observed in (Fawzi & Frossard, 2015). They compute the minimum transformation
required to fool the model and use it as a measure for a quantitative comparison of different architectures
and training procedures. The main difference to our work is that we focus on the optimization aspect of
the problem. We show that a few random queries usually suffice for a successful attack, while first-order
methods are ineffective. Moreover, we go beyond standard data augmentation and evaluate the effectiveness
of natural baseline defenses.
The concurrent work of Kanbak et al. (2018) proposes a different first-order method to evaluate the
robustness of classifiers based on geodesic distances on a manifold. This metric is harder to interpret than our
parametrized attack space. Moreover, given our findings on the non-concavity of the optimization landscape,
it is unclear how close their method is to the ground truth (exhaustive enumeration). While they perform a
limited study of defenses (adversarial fine-tuning) using their method, it appears to be less effective than our
baseline worst-of-10 training. We attribute this difference to the inherent obstacles first-order methods face
in this optimization landscape.
Recently, Xiao et al. (2018) and Tramèr & Boneh (2017) observed independently that it is possible to use
various spatial transformations to construct adversarial examples for naturally and `∞-adversarially trained
models. The main difference from our work is that we show even very simple transformations (translations
and rotations) are sufficient to break a variety of classifiers, while the transformations employed in (Xiao
et al., 2018) and (Tramèr & Boneh, 2017) are more involved. The transformation in (Xiao et al., 2018) is
based on performing a displacement of individual pixels in the original image constrained to be globally
smooth and then optimized for misclassification probability. Tramèr & Boneh (2017) consider an `∞-bounded
pixel-wise perturbation of a version of the original image that has been slightly rotated and in which a few
random pixels have been flipped. Both of these methods require direct access to the attacked model (or a
surrogate) to compute (or at least estimate) the gradient of the loss function with respect to the model’s input.
In contrast, our attacks can be implemented using only a small number of random, non-adaptive inputs.
3 Adversarial Rotations and Translations
Recall that in the context of image classification, an adversarial example for a given input image x and a
classifier C is an image x′ that satisfies two properties: (i) on the one hand, the adversarial example x′ causes
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the classifier C to output a different label on x′ than on x, i.e., we have C(x) 6= C(x′). (ii) On the other hand,
the adversarial example x′ is “visually similar” to x.
Clearly, the notion of visual similarity is not precisely defined here. In fact, providing a precise and
rigorous definition is extraordinarily difficult as it would require formally capturing the notion of human
perception. Consequently, previous work largely settled on the assumption that x′ is a valid adversarial
example for x if and only if ‖x − x′‖p ≤ ε for some p ∈ [0,∞] and ε small enough. This convention is
based on the fact that two images are indeed visually similar when they are close enough in some `p-norm.
However, the converse is not necessarily true. A small rotation or translation of an image usually appears
visually similar to a human, yet can lead to a large change when measured in an `p-norm. We aim to
expand the range of similarity measures considered in the adversarial examples literature by investigating
robustness to small rotations and translations.
Attack methods. Our first goal is to develop sufficiently strong methods for generating adversarial rotations
and translations. In the context of pixel-wise `p-bounded perturbations, the most successful approach for
constructing adversarial examples so far has been to employ optimization methods on a suitable loss
function (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017). Following this approach, we
parametrize our attack method with a set of tunable parameters and then optimize over these parameters.
First, we define the exact range of attacks we want to optimize over. For the case of rotation and
translation attacks, we wish to find parameters (δu, δv, θ) such that rotating the original image by θ degrees
around the center and then translating it by (δu, δv) pixels causes the classifier to make a wrong prediction.
Formally, the pixel at position (u, v) is moved to the following position (assuming the point (0, 0) is the
center of the image): [
u′
v′
]
=
[
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
]
·
[
u
v
]
+
[
δu
δv
]
.
We implement this transformation in a differentiable manner using the spatial transformer blocks of (Jader-
berg et al., 2015) 2. In order to handle pixels that are mapped to non-integer coordinates, the transformer
units include a differentiable bilinear interpolation routine. Since our loss function is differentiable with
respect to the input and the transformation is in turn differentiable with respect to its parameters, we can
obtain gradients of the model’s loss function w.r.t. the perturbation parameters. This enables us to apply a
first-order optimization method to our problem.
By defining the spatial transformation for some x as T(x; δu, δv, θ), we construct an adversarial perturba-
tion for x by solving the problem
max
δu,δv,θ
L(x′, y), for x′ = T(x; δu, δv, θ) , (1)
where L is the loss function of the neural network3, and y is the correct label for x.
We compute the perturbation from Equation 1 in three distinct ways:
• First-Order Method (FO): Starting from a random choice of parameters, we iteratively take steps in
the direction of the gradient of the loss function. This is the direction that locally maximizes the loss of
the classifier (as a surrogate for misclassification probability). Since the maximization problem we are
optimizing is non-concave, there are no guarantees for global optimality, but the hope is that the local
maximum solution closely approximates the global optimum. Note that unlike the `p-norm case, we
are not optimizing in the pixel space but in the latent space of rotation and translation parameters.
• Grid Search: We discretize the parameter space and exhaustively examine every possible parametriza-
tion of the attack to find one that causes the classifier to give a wrong prediction (if such a parametriza-
tion exists). Since our parameter space is low-dimensional enough, this method is computationally
feasible (in contrast to a grid search for `p-based adversaries).
2We used the open source implementation found here: https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/
transformer.
3The loss L of the classifier is a function from images to real numbers that expresses the performance of the network on the particular
example x (e.g., the cross-entropy between predicted and correct distributions).
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• Worst-of-k: We randomly sample k different choices of attack parameters and choose the one on which
the model performs worst. As we increase k, this attack interpolates between a random choice and
grid search.
We remark that while a first-order attack requires full knowledge of the model to compute the gradient of
the loss with respect to the input, the other two attacks do not. They only require the outputs corresponding
to chosen inputs, which can be done with only query access to the target model.
4 Improving Invariance to Spatial Transformations
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Figure 2: Loss landscape of a random example for each dataset when performing left-right translations and
rotations. Translations and rotations are restricted to 10% of the image pixels and 30◦, respectively. We
observe that the landscape is significantly non-concave, rendering first-order methods to generate adversarial
example ineffective. Figure 12 in the appendix shows additional examples.
As we will see in Section 5, augmenting the training set with random rotations and translations does
improve the robustness of the model against such random transformations. However, data augmentation
does not significantly improve the robustness against worst-case attacks and sometimes leads to a drop in
accuracy on unperturbed images. To address these issues, we explore two simple baselines that turn out to
be surprisingly effective.
Robust Optimization. Instead of performing standard empirical risk minimization to train the classifi-
cation model, we utilize ideas from robust optimization. Robust optimization has a rich history (Ben-Tal
et al., 2009) and has recently been applied successfully in the context of defending neural networks against
adversarial examples (Madry et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2018).
The main barrier to applying robust optimization for spatial transformations is the lack of an efficient proce-
dure to compute the worst-case perturbation of a given example. Performing a grid search (as described in
Section 3) is prohibitive as this would increase the training time by a factor close to the grid size, which can
easily be a factor 100 or 1,000. Moreover, the non-convexity of the loss landscape prevents potentially more
efficient first-order methods from discovering (approximately) worst-case transformations (see Section 5 for
details).
Given that we cannot fully optimize over the space of translations and rotations, we instead use a coarse
approximation provided by the worst-of-10 adversary (as described in Section 3). So each time we use an
example during training, we first sample 10 transformations of the example uniformly at random from the
space of allowed transformations. We then evaluate the model on each of these transformations and train
on the one perturbation with the highest loss. This corresponds to approximately minimizing a min-max
formulation of robust accuracy similar to (Madry et al., 2018). Training against such an adversary increases
the overall time by a factor of roughly six.4
4We need to perform 10 forward passes and one backwards pass instead of one forward and one backward pass required for
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Aggregating Random Transformations. As Section 5 shows, the accuracy against a random transformation
is significantly higher than the accuracy against the worst transformation in the allowed attack space. This
motivates the following inference procedure: compute a (typically small) number of random transformations
of the input image and output the label that occurs the most in the resulting set of predictions. We constrain
these random transformations to be within 5% of the input image size in each translation direction and up
to 15◦ of rotation. 5 The training procedure and model can remain unchanged while the inference time is
increased by a small factor (equal to the number of transformations we evaluate on).
Combining Both Methods. The two methods outlined above are orthogonal and in some sense comple-
mentary. We can therefore combine robust training (using a worst-of-k adversary) and majority inference to
further increase the robustness of our models.
5 Experiments
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Figure 3: Fine-grained dataset analysis. For each model, we visualize what percent of the test set can be
fooled via various methods. We compute how many examples can be fooled with either translations or
rotations ("any"), how many can be fooled only by one of these, and how many require a combination to be
fooled ("both").
We evaluate standard image classifiers for the MNIST (LeCun, 1998), CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) and
ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015) datasets. In order to determine the extent to which misclassification is
caused by insufficient data augmentation during training, we examine various data augmentation methods.
We begin with a description of our experimental setup.
Model Architecture. For MNIST, we use a convolutional neural network derived from the TensorFlow
Tutorial (Abadi et al., 2016). In order to obtain a fully convolutional version of the network, we replace the
fully-connected layer by two convolutional layers with 128 and 256 filters each, followed by a global average
pooling. For CIFAR10, we consider a standard ResNet (He et al., 2016) model with 4 groups of residual
layers with filter sizes [16, 16, 32, 64] and 5 residual units each. We use standard and `∞-adversarially trained
models similar to those studied by Madry et al. (2018).6,7 For ImageNet, we use a ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016)
architecture implemented in the tensorpack repository (Wu et al., 2016). We did not modify the model
architectures or training procedures.
Attack Space. In order to maintain the visual similarity of images to the natural ones we restrict the space
of allowed perturbations to be relatively small. We consider rotations of at most 30◦ and translations of at
standard training.
5Note that if an adversary rotates an image by 30◦ (a valid attack in our threat model), we may end up evaluating the image on
rotations of up to 45◦.
6https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
7https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
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most (roughly) 10% percent of the image size in each direction. This corresponds to 3 pixels for MNIST
(image size 28× 28) and CIFAR10 (image size 32× 32), and 24 pixels for ImageNet (image size 299× 299).
For grid search attacks, we consider 5 values per translation direction and 31 values for rotations, equally
spaced. For first-order attacks, we use 200 steps of projected gradient descent of step size 0.01 times the
parameter range. When rotating and translating the images, we fill the empty space with zeros (black pixels).
Data Augmentation. We consider five variants of training for our models.
• Standard training: The standard training procedure for the respective model architecture.
• `∞-bounded adversarial training: The classifier is trained on `∞-bounded adversarial examples that
are generated with projected gradient descent.
• No random cropping: Standard training for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet includes data augmentation via
random crops. We investigate the effect of this data augmentation scheme by also training a model
without random crops.
• Random rotations and translations: At each training step, we perform a uniformly random perturbation
from the attack space on each training example.
• Random rotations and translations from larger intervals: As before, we perform uniformly random
perturbations, but now from a superset of the attack space (40◦, ± 13% pixels).
5.1 Evaluating Model Robustness
We evaluate all models against random and grid search adversaries with rotations and translations considered
both separately and together. We report the results in Table 1. We visualize a random subset of successful
attacks in Figures 5, 6, and 7 of Appendix A.
Despite the high accuracy of standard models on unperturbed examples and their reasonable performance
on random perturbations, a grid search can significantly lower the classifiers’ accuracy on the test set. For
the standard models, accuracy drops from 99% to 26% on MNIST, 93% to 3% on CIFAR10, and 76% to 31%
on ImageNet (Top 1 accuracy).
The addition of random rotations and translations during training greatly improves both the random
and adversarial accuracy of the classifier for MNIST and CIFAR10, but less so for ImageNet. For the first two
datasets, data augmentation increases the accuracy against a grid adversary by 60% to 70%, while the same
data augmentation technique adds less than 3% accuracy on ImageNet.
We perform a fine-grained investigation of our findings:
• In Figure 3 we examine how many examples can be fooled by (i) rotations only, (ii) translations only,
(iii) neither transformation, or (iv) both.
• We visualize the set of fooling angles for a random sample of the rotations-only grid in Figure 4 on
ImageNet, and provide more examples in the appendix in Figure 10. We observe that the set of fooling
angles is nonconvex and not contiguous.
• To investigate how many transformations are adversarial per image, we analyze the percentage of
misclassified grid points for each example in Figure 11. While the majority of images has only a small
number of adversarial transformations, a significant fraction of images is fooled by 20% or more of the
transformations.
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Table 1: Accuracy of different classifiers against rotation and translation adversaries on MNIST, CIFAR10,
and ImageNet. The allowed transformations are translations by (roughly) 10% of the image size and ±30◦
rotations. The attack parameters are chosen through random sampling or grid search with rotations and
translations considered both together (“Rand.”, “Grid”) and separately (“Rand. T.” and “Grid T.” for
transformations, “Rand R.” and “Grid R.” for rotations). We consider networks that are trained with (i) the
respective standard setup, (ii) no data augmentation (if data augmentation is present in standard setup), (iii)
with an `∞ adversary, (iv) with data augmentation corresponding to the attack space (±3px,±30◦) and an
enlarged space (±4px,±40◦), and (v) with worst-of-10 training for both types of augmentations.
Model Nat. Rand. Grid Rand. T. Grid T. Rand. R. Grid R.
M
N
IS
T
Standard 99.31% 94.23% 26.02% 98.61% 89.80% 95.68% 70.98%
`∞-Adv 98.65% 88.02% 1.20% 93.72% 34.13% 95.27% 72.03%
Aug. 30 99.53% 99.35% 95.79% 99.47% 98.66% 99.34% 98.23%
Aug. 40 99.34% 99.31% 96.95% 99.39% 98.65% 99.40% 98.49%
W-10 (30) 99.48% 99.37% 97.32% 99.50% 99.01% 99.39% 98.62%
W-10 (40) 99.42% 99.39% 97.88% 99.45% 98.89% 99.36% 98.85%
C
IF
A
R
10
Standard 92.62% 60.93% 2.80% 88.54% 66.17% 75.36% 24.71%
No Crop 90.34% 54.64% 1.86% 81.95% 46.07% 69.23% 18.34%
`∞-Adv 80.21% 58.33% 6.02% 78.15% 59.02% 62.85% 20.98%
Aug. 30 90.02% 90.92% 58.90% 91.76% 79.01% 91.14% 76.33%
Aug. 40 88.83% 91.18% 61.69% 91.53% 77.42% 91.10% 76.80%
W-10 (30) 91.34% 92.35% 69.17% 92.43% 83.01% 92.33% 81.82%
W-10 (40) 91.00% 92.11% 71.15% 92.28% 82.15% 92.53% 82.25%
Im
ag
eN
et
Standard 75.96% 63.39% 31.42% 73.24% 60.42% 67.90% 44.98%
No Crop 70.81% 59.09% 16.52% 66.75% 45.17% 62.78% 34.17%
Aug. 30 65.96% 68.60% 32.90% 70.27% 45.72% 69.28% 47.25%
Aug. 40 66.19% 67.58% 33.86% 69.50% 44.60% 68.88% 48.72%
W-10 (30) 76.14% 73.19% 52.76% 74.42% 61.18% 73.74% 61.06%
W-10 (40) 74.64% 71.36% 50.23% 72.86% 59.34% 71.95% 59.23%
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Figure 4: Visualizing which angles fool ImageNet classifiers for 50 random examples. For each dataset and
model, we visualize one example per row. Red corresponds to misclassification of the images. We observe
that the angles fooling the models form a highly non-convex set. Figure 10 in the appendix shows additional
examples for CIFAR10 and MNIST.
Padding Experiments. A natural question is whether the reduced accuracy of the models is due to the
cropping applied during the transformation. We verify that this is not the case by applying zero and reflection
padding to the image datasets. We note that the zero padding creates a “black canvas” version of the dataset,
ensuring that no information from the original image is lost after a transformation. We show a random set
of adversarial examples in this setting in Figure 8 and a full evaluation in Table 4. We also provide more
details regarding reflection padding in Section B and provide an evaluation in Table 6. All of these are in
Appendix A.
5.2 Comparing Attack Methods
In Table 2 we compare different attack methods on various classifiers and datasets. We observe that worst-of-
10 is a powerful adversary despite its limited interaction with the target classifier. The first-order adversary
performs significantly worse. It fails to approximate the ground-truth accuracy of the models and performs
significantly worse than the grid adversary and even the worst-of-10 adversary.
Table 2: Comparison of attack methods across datasets and models. Worst-of-10 is very effective and
significantly reduces the model accuracy despite the limited interaction. The first-order (FO) adversary
performs poorly, despite the large number of steps allowed. We compare standard training to Augmentation
(±3px,±30◦). For the full table, see Figure 3 of Appendix A.
MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet
Standard Aug. Standard Aug. Standard Aug.
Natural 99.31% 99.53% 92.62% 90.02% 75.96% 65.96%
Worst-of-10 73.32% 98.33% 20.13% 79.92% 47.83% 50.62%
First-Order 79.84% 98.78% 62.69% 85.92% 63.12% 66.05%
Grid 26.02% 95.79% 2.80% 58.92% 31.42% 32.90%
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Understanding the Failure of First-Order Methods. The fact that first-order methods fail to reliably find
adversarial rotations and translations is in sharp contrast to previous work on `p-robustness (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018). For `p-bounded perturbations parametrized directly in pixel space, prior
work found the optimization landscape to be well-behaved which allowed first-order methods to consistently
find maxima with high loss. In the case of spatial perturbations, we observe that the non-concavity of the
problem is a significant barrier for first-order methods. We investigate this issue by visualizing the loss
landscape. For a few random examples from the three datasets, we plot the cross-entropy loss of the
examples as a function of translation and rotation. Figure 2 shows one example for each dataset and
additional examples are visualized in Figure 12 of the appendix. The plots show that the loss landscape is
indeed non-concave and contains many local maxima of low value. The low-dimensional problem structure
seems to make non-concavity a crucial obstacle. Even for MNIST, where we observe fewer local maxima, the
large flat regions prevent first-order methods from finding transformations of high loss.
Relation to Black-Box Attacks. Given its limited interaction with the model, the worst-of-10 adversary
achieves a significant reduction in classification accuracy. It performs only 10 random, non-adaptive queries to
the model and is still able to find adversarial examples for a large fraction of the inputs (see Table 2). The
low query complexity is an important baseline for black-box attacks on neural networks, which recently
gained significant interest (Papernot et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Bhagoji et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018).
Black-box attacks rely only function evaluations of the target classifier, without additional information such
as gradients. The main challenge is to construct an adversarial example from a small number of queries.
Our results show that it is possible to find adversarial rotations and translations for a significant fraction of
inputs with very few queries.
Combining Spatial and `∞-Bounded Perturbations Table 1 shows that models trained to be robust to
`∞-bounded perturbations do not achieve higher robustness to spatial perturbations. This provides evidence
that the two families of perturbation are orthogonal to each other. We further investigate this possibility
by considering a combined adversary that utilizes `∞-bounded perturbations on top of rotations and
translations. The results are shown in Figure 13. We indeed observe that these combined attacks reduce
classification accuracy in an (approximately) additive manner.
5.3 Evaluating Our Defense Methods.
As we see in Table 1, training with a worst-of-10 adversary significantly increases the spatial robustness of the
model, also compared to data augmentation with random transformations. We conjecture that using more
reliable methods to compute the worst-case transformations will further improve these results. Unfortunately,
increasing the number of random transformations per training example quickly becomes computationally
expensive. And as pointed out above, current first-order methods also appear to be insufficient for finding
worst-case transformations efficiently.
Our results for majority-based inference are presented in Table 5 of Appendix A. By combining these two
defenses, we improve the worst-case performance of the models from 26% to 98% on MNIST, from 3% to
82% on CIFAR10, and from 31% to 56% on ImageNet (Top 1).
6 Conclusions
We examined the robustness of state-of-the-art image classifiers to translations and rotations. We observed
that even a small number of randomly chosen perturbations of the input are sufficient to considerably
degrade the classifier’s performance.
The fact that common neural networks are vulnerable to simple and naturally occurring spatial transfor-
mations (and that these transformations can be found easily from just a few random tries) indicates that
adversarial robustness should be a concern not only in a fully worst-case security setting. We conjecture
10
that additional techniques need to be incorporated in the architecture and training procedures of modern
classifiers to achieve worst-case spatial robustness. Also, our results underline the need to consider broader
notions of similarity than only pixel-wise distances when studying adversarial misclassification attacks. In
particular, we view combining the pixel-wise distances with rotations and translations as a next step towards
the “right” notion of similarity in the context of images.
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A Omitted Tables and Figures
Table 3: Comparison of attack methods across datasets and models.
Model Natural Worst-of-10 FO Grid
M
N
IS
T
Standard 99.31% 73.32% 79.84% 26.02%
`∞-Adversarially Trained 98.65% 51.18% 81.23% 1.20%
Aug. 30 (±3px,±30◦) 99.53% 98.33% 98.78% 95.79%
Aug. 40 (±4px,±40◦) 99.34% 98.49% 98.74% 96.95%
C
IF
A
R
10
Standard 92.62% 20.13% 62.69% 2.80%
No Crop 90.34% 15.04% 52.27% 1.86%
`∞-Adversarially Trained 80.21% 19.38% 33.24% 6.02%
Aug. 30 (±3px,±30◦) 90.02% 79.92% 85.92% 58.92%
Aug. 40 (±4px,±40◦) 88.83% 80.47% 85.48% 61.69%
Im
ag
eN
et Standard 75.96% 47.83% 63.12% 31.42%
No Crop 70.81% 35.52% 55.93% 16.52%
Aug. 30 (±24px,±30◦) 65.96% 50.62% 66.05% 32.90%
Aug. 40 (±32px,±40◦) 66.19% 51.11% 66.14% 33.86%
Table 4: Evaluation of a subset of Table 1 in the “black-canvas” setting (images are zero-padded to avoid
cropping due to rotations and translations). The models are trained on padded images.
Natural Random Worst-of-10 Grid Trans. Grid Rot. Grid
C
IF
A
R
10
Standard 91.81% 70.23% 25.51% 6.55% 83.38% 12.44%
No Crop 89.70% 52.86% 14.14% 1.17% 47.94% 9.46%
Aug. 30 (±3px,±30◦) 91.45% 90.82% 80.53% 63.64% 82.28% 76.32%
Aug. 40 (±4px,±40◦) 91.24% 91.00% 81.81% 66.64% 81.75% 78.57%
Im
ag
eN
et Standard 73.60% 46.59% 29.51% 15.38% 28.03% 23.81%
No Crop 66.28% 38.70% 14.17% 3.43% 8.87% 10.97%
Aug. 30 (±24px,±30◦) 64.60% 67.75% 47.32% 28.51% 45.33% 39.33%
Aug. 40 (±32px,±40◦) 49.20% 57.69% 38.36% 22.10% 32.84% 32.95%
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Figure 5: MNIST. Successful adversarial examples for the models studied in Section 5. Rotations are restricted
to be within 30◦ of the original image and translations up to 3 pixels per direction (image size 28× 28). Each
example is visualized along with its predicted label in the original and perturbed versions.
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Figure 6: CIFAR10. Successful adversarial examples for the models studied in Section 5. Rotations are
restricted to be within 30◦ of the original and translations up to 3 pixels per directions (image size 32× 32).
Each example is visualized along with its predicted label in the original and perturbed version.
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Figure 7: ImageNet. Successful adversarial examples for the models studied in Section 5. Rotations are
restricted to be within 30◦ of the original and translations up to 24 pixels per directions (image size 299× 299).
Each example is visualized along with its predicted label in the original and perturbed version.
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Figure 8: Sample adversarial transformations for the "black-canvas" setting for the standard models on
CIFAR10 and ImageNet.
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Figure 9: Sample adversarial transformations for the reflection padding setting for the standard models on
CIFAR10.
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Figure 10: Visualizing which angles fool the classifier for 50 random examples on CIFAR and MNIST. For
each dataset and model, we visualize one example per row. Red corresponds to misclassification of the images.
We observe that the angles fooling the models form a highly non-convex set.
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Figure 11: Cumulative Density Function plots. For each fraction of grid points p, we plot the percentage of
correctly classified test set examples that are fooled by at least p of the grid points. For instance, we can see
from the first plot, MNIST Translations and Rotations, that approximately 10% of the correctly classified
natural examples are misclassified under 1/5 of the grid points transformations.
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Figure 12: Loss landscape of 4 random examples for each dataset when performing left-right translations
and rotations. Translations and rotations are restricted to 10% of the image pixels and 30◦ respectively.
We observe that the landscape is significantly non-concave, making rendering FO methods for adversarial
example generation powerless. 21
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Figure 13: Accuracy of different classifiers against `∞-bounded adversaries with various values of ε and
spatial transformations. For each value of ε, we perform PGD to find the most adversarial `∞-bounded
perturbation. Additionally, we combine PGD with random rotations and translations and with a grid search
over rotations and translations in order to find the transformation that combines with PGD in the most
adversarial way.
B Mirror Padding
In the experiments of Section 5, we filled the remaining pixels of rotated and translated images with black
(also known as zero or constant padding). This is the standard approach used when performing random
cropping for data augmentation purposes. We briefly examined the effect of mirror padding, that is replacing
empty pixels by reflecting the image around the border8. The results are shown in Table 6. We observed that
training with one padding method and evaluating using the other resulted in a significant drop in accuracy.
Training using one of these methods randomly for each example resulted in a model which roughly matched
the best-case of the two individual cases.
8https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/pad
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Table 5: Majority Defense. Accuracy of different models on the natural evaluation set and against a combined
rotation and translation adversary using aggregation of multiple random transformations.
Natural Acc. Grid Acc.
Model Stand. Vote Stand. Vote
M
N
IS
T
Standard 99.31% 98.71% 26.02% 18.80%
Aug 30. 99.53% 99.41% 95.79% 95.32%
Aug 40. 99.34% 99.25% 96.95% 97.65%
W-10 (30) 99.48% 99.40% 97.32% 96.95%
W-10 (40) 99.42% 99.41% 97.88% 98.47%
C
IF
A
R
10
Standard 92.62% 80.37% 2.82% 7.85%
Aug 30. 90.02% 92.70% 58.90% 69.65%
Aug 40. 88.83% 92.50% 61.69% 76.54%
W-10 (30) 91.34% 93.38% 69.17% 77.33%
W-10 (40) 91.00% 93.40% 71.15% 81.52%
Im
ag
eN
et
Standard 75.96% 73.19% 31.42% 40.21%
Aug 30. 65.96% 72.44% 32.90% 44.46%
Aug 40. 66.19% 71.46% 33.86% 46.98%
W-10 (30) 76.14% 74.92% 52.76% 56.45%
W-10 (40) 74.64% 73.38% 50.23% 56.23%
Natural
Random
(Zero)
Random
(Mirror)
Grid Search
(Zero)
Grid Search
(Mirror)
Standard Nat 92.62% 60.76% 66.42% 8.08% 5.37%
Standard Adv 80.21% 59.79% 67.12% 7.20% 12.89%
Aug. A, Zero 90.25% 91.09% 87.67% 59.87% 40.55%
Aug. B, Zero 89.55% 91.40% 87.94% 62.42% 42.37%
Aug. A, Mirror 92.25% 88.43% 91.05% 41.46% 53.95%
Aug. B, Mirror 92.03% 88.58% 91.34% 45.44% 57.97%
Aug. A, Both 91.80% 90.98% 91.28% 56.95% 52.60%
Aug. B, Both 91.57% 91.87% 91.11% 60.46% 56.13%
Table 6: CIFAR10: The effect of using reflection or zero padding when training a model. The experimental
setup matches that of Section 5. Zero padding refers to filling the empty pixels caused by translations and
rotations with black. Mirror padding corresponds to using a reflection of the images. "Both" refers to training
using both methods and alternating randomly between them for each training example.
23
